Consider the implications of the prior sub-section: the law itself may be inconsistent with substantive justice—it may be inconsistent with what you or I believe is right.
Therefore, argument within a legal system is different from argument outside, because the legal system is sympathetic to certain arguments that would not meet as great a welcome outside the legal system, and because it discounts other arguments that would be more appealing outside the legal system.
To a great extent, the legal system itself sets the rules about what kinds of arguments will be successful within that system. The legal system is partially independent of the society in which it operates.
But the crossroads here is that the character of a system is totally different from the character of different forms of social systems. This book focuses on the categories of arguments that are characteristic of legal systems.
And yet, as a result of these arguments can also be understood as natural, human arguments, that answer normal logic, and that are supported common realities of structure, it’s not stunning that these arguments resonate and are helpful in non-legal contexts further.